The Times has a very good story about the virulence of the Haqqani Network, which every U.S. military expert and east-Afghanistan veteran I've ever talked to considers far and away the most sophisticated and capable insurgent fighting force. (I'll be going into this in more detail in a forthcoming Danger Room piece.) They're a gangster organization that exhibits, as David Rohde learned the hard way, flashes of ideological motivation. They make their money running "what is in effect a protection racket for construction firms -- meaning that American taxpayers are helping to finance the enemy network."
A NATO officer who tracks Haqqani activities in southeastern Afghanistan gave a blunt assessment of the Haqqanis’ brutal ways of intimidation, saying: “They will execute you at a checkpoint, or stop you and go through your phone. And, if they find you’re connected to the government, you’ll turn up in the morgue. And that sends a message.”
When you think about it, the fact that the Haqqanis ended up on the side of the insurgency is an unspeakable American blunder. Jaleleddin n' sons were not an unknown quantity to the United States. In fact, despite wide-ranging ignorance of Afghanistan during the invasion and early years of the war, the Haqqanis were an exception, since they were CIA allies during the anti-Soviet jihad.
American intelligence officers who worked directly with Mr. Haqqani had a somewhat less starry-eyed view. “He was always a wild-eyed guy,” said the former American intelligence official who worked with the Haqqanis. “But we weren’t talking about getting these guys scholarships to Harvard or M.I.T. He was the scourge of the Soviets.”
I remember hanging out in Khost with a crusty Australian reporter named Tony Davis in 2008. He pointed at a ridge close to the Pakistan border and told me, with pride, that that was where he had crossed into Afghanistan nearly 20 years earlier with Jalaleddin following a long trek from Peshawar.
What happened? Why weren't the Haqqanis brought into the fold? If you know that the Haqqanis were the scourge of the Soviets, and you know that you can work with them, why wasn't every effort made to secure -- at the very least -- their neutrality? As it happens, the Wall Street Journal went a long way toward answering that question in 2007:
Mr. Haqqani is now one of the major rebel leaders roiling Afghanistan. But back in autumn 2002, he secretly sent word that he could ally with the new U.S.-friendly Afghan government. The warlord had once been a partner of the Central Intelligence Agency, and later closely collaborated with Osama bin Laden and the ruling Taliban. CIA officers held talks with his brother, Ibrahim, and made plans to meet with Mr. Haqqani, who was leading some of the Taliban’s troops.
But U.S. military forces operating separately from the CIA arrested Ibrahim — cutting off the talks and entrenching his brother as a nemesis. Mr. Haqqani is still fighting U.S. troops along the Pakistan border. “We blew our chance,” contends one of the CIA officers involved who had worked with Mr. Haqqani in the 1980s. “I truly believe he could have been on our side.”
That's way beyond Accidental-Guerrilla territory. If that account is correct, then a gangster network with a bathtub full of American blood on its hands was turned into an enemy because of a bureaucratic screw-up of the worst kind. Even if it's not true, there's no excuse for the U.S. failure to make courting Haqqani a top imperative for the Afghanistan war.